New evidence on determinants of IP litigation : a market-based approach by Czarnitzki, Dirk & Criekingen, Kristof van
Dis cus si on Paper No. 18-018
New Evidence on Determinants  
of IP Litigation:  
A Market-based Approach
Dirk Czarnitzki and Kristof Van Criekingen
Dis cus si on Paper No. 18-018
New Evidence on Determinants  
of IP Litigation:  
A Market-based Approach
Dirk Czarnitzki and Kristof Van Criekingen
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp18018.pdf
Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von  
neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung  
der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.
Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW  research prompt ly avai la ble to other  
eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly  
respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.
 
 
 
New evidence on determinants of IP litigation:  
A market-based approach 
 
Dirk Czarnitzkia,b,c and Kristof Van Criekingena,b 
a) KU Leuven, Dept. of Managerial Economics, Strategy and Innovation, Leuven, Belgium 
b) Centre for R&D Monitoring (ECOOM) at KU Leuven, Belgium 
c) Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Mannheim, Germany 
 
March 2018 
 
Abstract 
We contribute to the economic literature on patent litigation by taking a new perspective. In 
the past, scholars mostly focused on specific litigation cases at the patent level and related 
technological characteristics to the event of litigation. However, observing IP disputes suggests 
that not only technological characteristics may trigger litigation suits, but also the market 
positions of firms, and that firms dispute not only about single patents but often about 
portfolios. Consequently, this paper examines the occurrence of IP litigation cases in Belgian 
firms using the 2013 Community Innovation Survey with supplemental information on IP 
litigation and patent portfolios. The rich survey information regarding firms’ general innovation 
strategies enables us to introduce market-related variables such as sales with new products as 
well as sales based mainly on imitation and incremental innovation. Our results indicate that 
when controlling for firms’ IP portfolio, the composition of turnover in terms of innovations and 
imitations has additional explanatory power regarding litigation propensities. Firms with a high 
turnover from innovations are more likely to become plaintiffs in court. Contrastingly, firms 
with a high turnover from incremental innovation and imitation are more likely to become 
defendants in court, and, moreover, are more likely to negotiate settlements outside of court.  
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1 Introduction 
The bulk of economic literature which has focused on patent litigation related the fact of litigation to 
technological characteristics of the underlying patent (see e.g. Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001, 2004, 
Cremers, 2006, 2009, Somaya, 2003, Hall and Ziedonis, 2007, Galasso and Schankerman, 2010, Galasso 
et al. 2013). In this paper, we take the analysis to the firm level and account for market outcomes of 
innovation projects. By considering the asymmetric impact market positions regarding imitations and 
market novelties may have on the propensities of becoming plaintiff or defendant at court, we show 
that the market valorization of innovations play a significant role in addition to technological 
characteristics of the challenged intellectual property (IP). We are furthermore able to investigate the 
occurrence of out of court settlements and retaliation actions in terms of requests for nullification of 
the underlying IPR. These issues are largely neglected by extant literature.   
IP litigation has been regarded as a niche topic in economics in the past. For instance, the number 
of patent litigation cases compared to the number of issued patents is fairly low. In the United States, 
for example, 1,706 patent cases were filed at US district courts in 1995. Compared to 114,241 issued 
patents, the litigation ratio only amounts to 1.5%. By 2005, these numbers, however, had risen to 
2706 vs. 165,485 (= 1.6%). According to recent figures (2013), the patent litigation cases peaked at 
6,386 (compared to 290,083 patents issued), yielding a litigation ratio of 2.2%. (Sources: USPTO’s 
performance & Accountability Report1; US Courts’ Judicial Facts and Figures2) Even more than the 
ratios, the absolute numbers show the growing importance of IP litigation: within two decades the 
number of patent litigation cases has almost quadrupled. It is also important to recognize the 
importance of IP litigation cases for the involved parties. According to PWC (2015) the annual median 
damage award ranged in the last 20 years between US$ 1.9 million to US$ 17 million (overall median 
= US$ 5.4 million). In light of the growing number of litigation cases since the 1990s, these numbers 
                                                          
1 See http://www.uspto.gov/about-us/performance-and-planning/uspto-annual-reports  
2 See http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/judicial-facts-and-figures  
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unambiguously show the importance of IP. The gravity of the matter becomes apparent when looking 
at the largest adjudicated damage awards in the last decades. In 2009, the damage award in the case 
Centocor Ortho Biotech Inc. vs. Abbott Laboratories concerning arthritis drugs amounted to US$ 1,673 
million, and, in 2007, the case Lucent Technologies Inc. vs. Microsoft Corporation concerning MP3 
technology amounted to US$ 1,538 million.3 In addition, plaintiffs and defendants may often settle on 
their IP disputes.  An example where parties settle on a larger scale is Google and Microsoft who 
settled upon about 20 IP dispute cases in Germany 4and the United States (October 1st, 2015). A more 
recent case reported in global news (May, 2016) is Nivdia and Samsung who settled upon all 
competing patent litigation cases before the U.S. International Trade Commission and U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office.5  
In this paper, we consequently add to the economic literature on patent litigation by taking a 
somewhat different perspective than the existing studies: 
1. The observation that firms battle over bundles of IP rights rather than single patents, for 
instance, suggests taking the analysis to the firm level rather than the patent level. We 
thus take portfolio variables at the firm level into account. 
2. While scholars mostly focused on specific litigation cases at the patent level and related 
technological characteristics to the event of litigation, the portfolio debate strongly 
suggests that not only technological characteristics matter, but that the market positions 
of firms may play a prominent role as well. Therefore, we will add new product sales of 
firms, obtained from survey data, to our empirical model of litigation. 
                                                          
3 Monetary figures adjusted for inflation to 2014 US dollars. The damage awards refer to initial 
adjudication, i.e. these awards may have been vacated, remanded or reduced, were settled while pending 
appeal, or are still under appeal. 
4 There is no centralized way to challenge the validity of a European Patent (Infringement is dealt with by 
the national courts). 
5 As our empirical study is on Belgian data, it seems noteworthy that of course also Belgian firms are 
involved in litigation cases. Examples are Lankhorst Composites vs. Samsonite Europe in 2005, and Abott 
Laboratories vs. Janssen Pharma in 2009. 
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3. Furthermore, using the sales of innovative products allows to characterize the market 
position in two ways: first, firms’ success with original, novel to the market innovations, 
and second, firms’ positions regarding more imitative and incremental innovations. These 
asymmetric market positions suggest in turn to differentiate between plaintiffs and 
defendants in court cases.  
4. In addition, survey data also suggests that the analysis of court cases as commonly done 
in prior literature neglects a large proportion of IP disputes that are settled outside of 
court.6 Therefore, the relevance of IP and its enforcement has been largely 
underestimated in the past. Consequently, we also investigate the occurrence of 
settlement outside of courts. 
5. We can also investigate retaliation actions, that is, nullification suits of IP by defendants 
against plaintiffs as response to accusation of infringements in court (see e.g. also 
Schliessler, 2013).  
6. Finally, IP disputes take place at a broader level than only patents. According to the US 
Courts’ Judicial Facts and Figures, for instance, 3,169 trademark cases and 3,666 copyright 
cases were filed with the US district courts on top of the 6,386 patent cases. Especially 
the non-negligible number of trademark cases emphasizes that market positions of firms 
may play an important role in the economic analysis of IP disputes (see point 2 above). In 
robustness checks we therefore also control for other IPRs than patents. 
The main data source consists of the Flemish part of the 2013 Community Innovation Survey 
which was supplemented with questions on IP litigation. The survey data is linked to patent data 
collected from the PATSTAT database and additional firm level data from BELFIRST of Bureau van Dijk 
(the Belgian part of the global Orbis database). The sample comprises innovating firms in the 
manufacturing and business-relevant service sectors. In contrast to many earlier studies, we can 
identify which firms filed IP infringement cases and which firms were accused of infringing others’ 
                                                          
6 A notable exception is Fournier and Zhuelke (1989). 
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IPRs. In addition, the survey data also allows to investigate which firms settled outside of court. The 
survey explicitly asked for settlement before firms went to court. Thus, our settlement variable allows 
to observe IP disputes that could never be detected with administrative data.7 The three IP dispute 
variables can be related to commonly used patent characteristics (mainly counts and forward 
citations, as measure of the patent portfolio value), but also to the market positions of firms with 
regard to their innovation performance. This comprises the sales of products novel to the market and 
the sales of other innovative products that are mainly based on imitation. In addition, other variables 
collected from the survey, such as registrations of trademarks, industrial designs, and copyrights can 
be used to control for IPRs beyond patents.  
Our data strongly indicates the importance of outside of court settlement for an analysis of IP 
infringement. About 8% of the companies were involved in a court case whereas nearly as much, 7%, 
made out of court settlements. Our results indicate that when controlling for the effects of the 
importance and quality of a firms’ IP portfolio, the composition of turnover in terms of innovations 
and imitations has additional explanatory power regarding litigation propensities. Firms with a high 
turnover from innovations are more likely to become plaintiffs in court. Contrastingly, firms with a 
high turnover from imitation and incremental innovation are more likely to become defendants in 
court, and, moreover, are more likely to negotiate settlements outside of court. The market at stake 
also seems to play a role in determining firms’ propensity to subsequently request nullification of the 
IP they are accused of infringing upon, i.e. high-volume imitators are more likely to request 
nullification of the original patent. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes the related 
literature on the determinants of patent litigation, and discusses the development of hypotheses to 
                                                          
7 Note that settlement e.g. in the Google vs. Microsoft in October 2015 does not refer to outside court 
settlement. These firms settled on pending court cases. Settling on pending court cases is not considered in 
our paper. It would be a second stage in an empirical model on suits. For evidence on in-court settlement, see 
e.g. Cremers and Schliessler (2015) and the references therein. 
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be tested. In section 3 the data, variables and their descriptive statistics are presented and discussed 
Section 4 summarizes and discusses the results of the regression analysis. Section 5 concludes. 
2 Related literature on the determinants of patent litigation 
Intuitively one can expect a positive link between litigation propensity and values at stake. A patent 
owner may earn monopoly profits in a market that is protect by a patent. If, however, a competitor 
infringes the patent and competes with the patent owner, both would make duopoly profits. It thus 
depends on the expected gains from a law suit versus forgone profits whether a patent owner sues a 
potential infringer. The expected gains from the law suit depend on the expected damage 
compensation (which will be largely determined by the forgone profits due to infringement) that the 
plaintiff may get in case of a successful lawsuit and the trial cost, such as court fees, attorney cost, 
fees for hearing witnesses), and the expected likelihood to win the case. The latter might not be 
obvious, as some patents may have been granted erroneously by the patent office and competitors 
also try to “invent around” patented technologies.  
Given these tradeoffs between expected gains and cost of litigation, the incentive to engage 
in litigation depends crucially on the product market. The larger the market for the innovation, the 
larger will be the incentive to engage as plaintiff in a court trial (cf. e.g. Bebchuck, 1984, and Hirshleifer 
1991, Hylton 2002, Schliessler, 2015).8  
These thoughts also apply to the perspective of a defendant, of course. A firm that achieves 
high sales with imitation might face higher likelihoods of litigation as IP owners may try to enforce 
their monopoly rights. The potential infringer might then have a high incentive to file a nullification 
suit against the IP of the plaintiff.  
In empirical studies on litigation, the “value at stake” is thus a critical variable. Scholars have often 
focused on technological characteristics and (possibly poor) economic value proxies of IPRs to explain 
                                                          
8 Hylton (2002) emphasizes in his theoretical model that social welfare would increase if damage 
compensation would actually by higher than foregone profits, as this deters infringement a-priori. 
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which intellectual assets may be subject to litigation, commonly using citation based measures to 
relate the value of a patent to litigation propensity.  
Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001, 2003, 2004) study the determinants of patent suits by 
examining the characteristics of litigated patents and their owners, finding that the value of the patent 
measured by forward citations and claims increases the likelihood of litigation. For Germany, Cremers 
(2007, 2009) investigates the incidence of litigation and the determinants of settlement of patent 
litigation in court. Similar to Lanjouw and Schankerman, she finds that more valuable patents are more 
likely to be involved in patent litigation and smaller firms are more likely to be involved in litigation 
cases. Her measures for patent value are forward citations, number of claims, and patent family size.9 
Somaya (2003) also explains settlement probabilities conditional on being at court. He shows that the 
likelihood of settlement in court trials of patent disputes decreases with forward citations and self-
citations which also points at the fact that firms tend to insist on their property rights when stakes are 
high. 
While these contributions all focus on the incidence of litigation at the patent level, only very few 
authors have started looking at the likelihood of being involved in litigation at the firm level; thereby 
focusing on the firms’ entire patent portfolio and other firm characteristics. Lerner (1995) shows that 
new biotechnology firms are less likely to patent in subclasses with many other (rival) patents when 
their litigation costs are high. “Patenting” should in this context be understood as not developing 
products in crowded technological domains. He interprets these results by stating that firms are aware 
of the potential to infringe upon their rivals’ patents and that they are willing to take precautions. In 
their contribution "The Patent Litigation Explosion" Bessen and Meurer (2005) look at patent litigation 
hazards for public firms in the US. As others, they approximate the value of stakes by forward citations 
and claims but also use the market value of the whole firm as an additional measure.  
                                                          
9 Family size refers to the number of jurisdictions in which patent protection has been sought for the 
same invention.  
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Focusing on US semiconductor firms between 1973 and 2001, Hall and Ziedonis (2007) also 
estimate the probability that firms will be involved in patent lawsuits, either as plaintiffs or as 
defendants. They find that size, patent stock, and R&D intensity all positively affect the likelihood of 
litigation. These variables are all expected to correlate positively with values at stake. Comparing their 
results for semiconductor firms to the broad sample of Bessen and Meurer, they find that the 
probability of being a defendant for semiconductor firms increases more strongly with a higher level 
of R&D intensity and size of the firm. 
Our paper contributes to the empirical research by measuring the market valuation of firms’ 
innovations more directly. Unlike existing studies, we have information on sales with new products. 
These can be split into sales with products that are new to the market, i.e. original innovation, and 
sales with products that are just new to the firm’s product portfolio but not new to the market. We 
refer to the latter as imitation. The central research question addressed in this paper focuses at firm 
level litigation propensities and can accordingly be summarized as: 
RQ. Does a firm’s market position with regard to innovation and imitation matter in 
triggering litigation suits and/or out of court settlement negotiations? 
We contribute to the literature by investigating whether beyond the technological characteristics of 
IP, the composition of turnover in terms of innovations and imitations has additional explanatory 
power regarding litigation propensities. As we can observe in our data whether a company acted as 
plaintiff or defendant in court proceedings and whether firms settled on IP disputes outside of court, 
we make the following three hypotheses: 
H1. The likelihood that a firm acts as plaintiff in an IP infringement case increases with its 
sales with market novelties (=innovations).  
We hypothesize a positive relationship between the sales with market novelties and litigation, as IP 
owners are more likely to enforce their monopoly right when the patent-protected innovations where 
successful at the market.  
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H2. An imitator will more likely be taken to court in an IP infringement case if the sales it 
generates from its imitations is higher. 
A firm that generates high sales with products that are just new to its product portfolio but not 
new to the market might be more at risk to infringe on existing IPRs owned by others, and thus 
it can be expected that these imitators are more likely to be involved in a litigation suit as 
defendants. 
H3. Firms are less likely to negotiate settlement deals outside of court if the sales they 
generate from either innovations or imitations is higher. 
Firms may generally first try to settle outside of court to save the trial cost.  
In addition to the main hypotheses stated above, this paper explores the relation between 
firms’ responses to the initial lawsuit and our market value measures of innovation and imitation. 
Once sued for infringement a firm can question the validity of the supposedly infringed upon IP and 
ask for so called nullification (see e.g. Farrel and Merges, 2004). This request for IPR nullification can 
be dependent on technological characteristics of the IP and market valuations thereof. If market value 
of the challenged IP is high, it is reasonable to expect higher nullification propensities when compared 
to lower market values. Companies might also be inclined to request invalidations to keep the option 
open to come up with more follow-on innovations later (see Galasso and Schankerman, 2015). From 
a firm perspective, this translates into the following hypothesis. 
H4. A defendant generating higher sales from imitations is more likely to request 
nullification of the allegedly infringed upon IPR. 
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3 Data and Variables 
The data set used to conduct the analysis originates from the Flemish Community Innovation Survey10, 
an inquiry about the innovative activity in the Flemish economy carried out biennially since 1993. The 
CIS methodological standards comprise a stratified random sampling procedure to ensure 
representativeness of the sample for the whole economy. The data consists of one cross-section of 
the Flemish economy surveyed in 2013 about their activities in the period spanning 2010-2012. We 
use the survey carried out in 2013 since it includes unique questions on IP litigation. The sample covers 
firms in the manufacturing as well as services sector.  
As the subsequent empirical study focuses on IP litigation and innovation, we only retain the 
subsample of innovating companies. According to the international guidelines for collecting 
innovation data from the business sector as described by the OSLO manual, an innovation is defined 
as: 
An innovation is the implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good 
or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new organizational method in 
business practices, workplace organization or external relations. (OECD Publishing, 
2005) 
We add to the survey data patent stock, patent quality and technology base fragmentation variables 
retrieved from PATSTAT. Additionally we also collected information on the firms cash position from 
the Belgian part of the ORBIS database, Belfirst. 
Considering item non-response on the variables used in our specifications and outlier deletion, the 
final estimation sample counts 733 observations.  
                                                          
10 This survey is conducted by the Centre for Research & Development Monitoring (ECOOM) on behalf of the Flemish 
government. 
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3.1 Dependent variables: IP litigation 
Regarding IP litigation, we consider three binary outcome variables measuring different IP 
infringement litigation modes that companies potentially encountered in the surveyed period. 
PLAINTIFF indicates whether a company was a plaintiff in an IP infringement case, i.e. the company 
owned IPRs and accused at least one other firm of infringement. DEFENDANT indicates whether a 
company was a defendant in an IP infringement case. Whether a company was involved in settlement 
negotiations or arrangements outside the court of law with the purpose of avoiding IPR disputes is 
indicated by SETTLE. Note that the three litigation outcome variables are not mutually exclusive. 
From the descriptive statistics in table 1 we see that the IP infringement litigation modes 
considered occur for a relatively small but still reasonable proportion of firms. About 6% of the firms 
go to court as a plaintiff whereas about 5% are being sued in court as a defendant. Settlement 
arrangements outside court happened for 7% of firms in the sample. 
Additionally, we consider two binary outcome variables indicating the reaction of the defendant 
to the accusation. If a defendant doubts the validity of the supposedly infringed upon IP, they can file 
for nullification of the intellectual property rights. PLAINTIFF NULL indicates whether, in response to 
the initial accusation by the focal company, the defendant filed for nullification of the IPR. This 
happens in 33% of the cases. Correspondingly, DEFENDANT NULL indicates whether the focal company 
filed for nullification if it was accused of IP infringement. This happens in 66% of all cases in our sample. 
As our dependent variables are binary, we subsequently estimate Probit models. 
3.2 Covariates of interest: market value measures of innovation and  patent portfolio 
value measures  
The main interest of the analysis lies in relating the dependent (IP litigation) variables to market value 
proxies of innovation, and whether these have additional explanatory power on top of commonly used 
technological value proxies of the IP portfolio. 
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Regarding the market value of a company’s innovation portfolio three components of turnover 
can be identified based on the survey: (a) sales from market novelties (i.e. products, goods or services, 
newly introduced to the market between 2010 and 2012), (b) sales from imitation and incremental 
innovation (i.e. products introduced in the period 2010-2012 that were new to the firm but not new 
to the market), (c) sales of unchanged products. The average turnover per employee originating from 
market novelties, NOVEL SALES, and new-to-firm innovations, IMITATION SALES, are € 23 688 and € 
18 671 respectively. From the companies in the sample, 48% generated no sales from market 
novelties, whereas 52% generated no sales from new-to-firm innovations, i.e. imitation. 
We construct three variables from the Patstat database which proxy the importance, quality, and 
composition of the patent portfolio: depreciated patent stock per employee (PATENT INTENSITY), 
patent quality (PATENT QUALITY), and fragmentation of prior art (FRAGMENTATION). In calculating 
these measures the patent application and citation data is truncated at 2010. Patent stock for firm i 
in year t was retrieved by applying the following formula: 
PATENSTOCK𝑖𝑡 = (1 − δ) PS𝑖𝑡−1 + patent applications𝑖𝑡 
where 𝛿, the constant knowledge depreciation rate, is set to 15%. As the patent stock might be 
highly correlated with firm size, we use the variable PATENT INTENSITY in the regressions that further 
scales the patent stock per employee. The patent applications are aggregated on the family level to 
obtain unique inventions. To mitigate endogeneity concerns this variable enters our specification as 
measured in 2010, i.e. before the period in which litigation is measured. From the companies in our 
sample about 10% has a strictly positive patent stock in 2010.  
PATENT QUALITY measure average quality of patents, i.e. the average number of forward 
citations to a patent within the company’s patent portfolio, and also enters as measured in 2010. All 
forward citations from the PATSTAT extract up to 2010 are counted. 
PATENT QUALITY𝑖  =
( # forward citations revieved by firm  i within a 5−year citation window  )
(# 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖)
 
Ziedonis (2004) calculates a patent fragmentation index by:  
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FRAGMENTATIONi = 1 −  ∑ (
#nbcitesij
#nbcitesi
)
2J
j=1
, i ≠ j 
where,  
nbcitesi= total number of backward citations for the patent portfolio of company i 
nbcitesij= total number of backward citations that the patent portfolio of company i makes to 
patents of company j. 
Our fragmentation index is calculated accordingly for all patents a firm has in its portfolio and might 
indeed influence litigation propensities as a more fragmented technology base makes infringement 
more likely (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). 
Since we look at litigation in relation to IP in general (in contrast to the literature on patent 
litigation in specific) we consider the importance of other IP next to patents in the firms’ portfolios. 
We thus also use trademarks as an appropriation mechanism for innovation (Mendonça et al., 2004). 
Industrial designs, which are more frequently infringed upon (Weatherall et al., 2009), should also be 
considered from the broader IP perspective. Dummy variables indicating whether the firm used 
industrial designs (DESIGN) and trademarks (TRADEMARK) as means of improving their competitive 
position are also available from the survey. 
3.3 Independent variables: other controls 
The necessity of R&D intensity as a control variable is apparent as: (a) intensive imitative R&D or (b) 
original own R&D efforts both increase the potential for infringement cases and thus trigger litigation 
(cf. Bessen and Meurer, 2006). We measure R&D INTENSITY as intramural R&D spending per employee 
in 2012.11 
Further general controls are firm size measured as number of employees (EMPLOYMENT) and age as 
years elapsed since foundation (AGE). Large and established firms might be more involved in IP 
litigation given the high cost of such trials (Bessen and Meurer, 2006, Hall and Ziedonis, 2007). We 
                                                          
11 Ideally, we would have preferred to observe R&D as a stock or at least as lagged value, but we simply 
do not have that information.  
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further consider the firms volume of cash and cash equivalent available (CASH) since firms with deep 
pockets might hesitate less to engage in litigation as the trial cost may not be a significant expense for 
them. A control for whether a firm handles legal IP issues in a separate department, IPDEPT, is also 
available. Finally, considering the appropriability literature stressing the diverging effectiveness of 
patent in different technological areas (e.g. Teece, 1986), sector dummies are used to control for inter-
sectorial differences.  
3.4 Descriptive statistics 
Summary statistics can be found in table 1. The average firm in our sample has about 115 employees 
and sells good and services of about € 300,000 per employee. Most sales are achieved with products 
that existed at least three year ago (i.e. before our sample period 2010). On average, firms achieve € 
260,000 per employee from unchanged products. The remaining € 40,000 per employee are almost 
split evenly between market novelties and imitation where market novelties amount to € 23,688 and 
€ 18,671.  
 
 Insert table 1 about here 
 
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix. There is no evidence of severe multicollinearity among our 
variables. The highest correlations between two explanatory variables occur between DESIGN and 
TRADEMARK with a correlation coefficient of 0.44, and between FRAGMENTATION and PATENT 
INTENSITY with 0.49.  
 
Insert table 2 about here 
 
Table 4 summarizes the final sample’s distribution over the sectors. Most innovative firms in the 
sample are in knowledge intensive services, i.e. telecommunications, software and engineering 
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services (202 observations). This is followed manufacture of food products, beverages, textiles and 
leather.  
 
 Insert table 3 about here 
 
Sample splits 
In table 4 we further split up the descriptive statistics by the three main outcome variables (PLAINTIFF, 
DEFENDANT, and SETTLE). 
 
Insert table 4 about here 
 
Companies involved in any kind of litigation or settlement procedure score higher on all right-hand 
side variables, meaning they generate more turnover per employee from novelties and imitations, are 
larger and older, are more R&D and patent intensive, have higher quality patents, draw from a more 
fragmented technology base, and are more likely to use trademarks and industrial designs. PLAINTIFFS 
tend to generate a higher turnover per employee from market novelties than DEFENDANTS, whereas 
DEFENDANTS have a higher turnover per employee generated from imitation and incremental 
innovation. Companies involved in SETTLEMENTS generate, on average, turnovers from novelties and 
imitations that lie in between the corresponding values of PLAINTIFFS and DEFENDANTS.  
3.5 Robustness to sample selection due to non-response and outlier deletion 
Given that due to outlier deletion and item non-response the size of the original sample of the survey 
shrank , we checked whether our results are robust when sampling weights are taken into account. 
All results below remain valid when running these weighted regressions (Results are not reported).  
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4 Results and discussion 
4.1 Initial litigation propensities (H1-H3) 
4.1.1 Main results 
In table 5 and 6 we estimate Probit models. For all models, we employ clustered standard errors at 
the NACE 3-digit industry level (which is more detailed than the included sector dummies) in order to 
allow for error term correlation across observations within the same industry. It could happen that 
the models explain IP disputes better (or worse) in certain industries where IPR is very relevant for 
firms’ main business strategies when compared to others where IP plays a smaller role. Clustered 
standard errors would account for the resulting error term correlation patterns across observations. 
Initially, in table 5, we regress the outcome variables on total sales per employee and the controls. In 
table 6, we split the sales per employee into its three relevant components, sales with innovations, 
sales with imitations and sales with unchanged products.  
The first specifications (1)-(3) only include the general firm level control variables next to our variables 
of interest in the regressions. In the extended specifications (4)-(6) control variables for the patent 
intensity (= patent stock per employee), patent quality (forward citations per patent), and the 
fragmentation index are added. In the columns (7)-(9) the design and trademark dummies are added.  
 
 Insert tables 5 and 6 about here 
 
In table 5, we find that total sales per employee do only explain the defendant dummy significantly, 
but not the plaintiff nor the settlement dummy. When the total sales are split into the components of 
NOVEL SALES, IMITATION, and UNCHANGED in Table 6, interesting differences are found. NOVEL 
SALES are positively associated with the likelihood to become a plaintiff. We interpret this finding as 
evidence that firms obtaining higher returns from their market novelties, i.e. their own, internally 
developed innovations are more likely to enforce their IPRs than firms that have only less successful 
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innovations. This finding is consistent with the view that the “value at stake” determines litigation 
events. Accordingly, we also find that the higher the sales with imitation, the more likely firms are to 
become defendant in an IP dispute. The “value at stake” argumentation also holds in this case. An IP 
owner may be more likely to enforce IP, the more returns others achieve with related or imitated 
products. In the case of settlement, we find that sales with imitation are positively associated with 
settlement, but market novelty sales are insignificant. All these findings are significant at the 5% level 
and remain robust across all specifications. The unchanged products turn out to be positively 
significant in the DEFENDANT model only. This might indicate simply that very successful firms, e.g. 
the market leaders, are more likely to be targets of litigation suits.  
In order to interpret the economic magnitude of the estimated effects for the main variables of 
interest, we calculate the change in predicted probabilities when the right hand side variable changes 
from its mean value to the mean plus one standard deviation. First, the predicted probability of 
becoming a plaintiff at the mean value of all regressors is 0.91%. When increasing the value of NOVEL 
SALES with one standard deviation, this predicted probability becomes 1.55%, i.e. the economic effect 
is sizable. While litigation, on average, is certainly a rare event still, the increase of a standard deviation 
in NOVEL SALES increases the likelihood to sue for infringement by about 70% (= 1.55/0.91  1) Second, 
the predicted probability of becoming a defendant at the mean value of all regressors is 2.01%. When 
increasing the value of IMITATION SALES with one standard deviation, this predicted probability 
becomes 2.95%, i.e. a 46% increase. Finally, the predicted probability of being involved in out of court 
settlements at the mean value of all regressors is 2.3%. When increasing the value of IMITATION SALES 
with one standard deviation, this predicted probability becomes 3.6%, i.e. a 50% increase.  
Regarding the other control variables, the patent intensity is positively and significantly 
associated with the probability to become a plaintiff in Table 5. This is in line with a large body of 
previous literature and is also the expected result; a firm owning more IP will also be more likely to 
enforce (parts of) it. Interestingly, this significant relationship disappears once the market positions of 
firms enter the models more flexibly, i.e. the sales are split into novel product sales, imitation and 
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unchanged products. We interpret this as indication that market success is driving litigation and not 
just IP ownership (that might not lead to significant returns in the market). A result that is statistically 
significant with a negative coefficient is the patent quality, though. Firms with a patent portfolio that 
received more citations per patent, all else constant, is less likely to be plaintiff and defendant. In the 
plaintiff equation, this is somewhat difficult to explain, but the significance level is also just 10%. It is 
however negative and significant at the 5% level in the defendant specification. If one would interpret 
patent quality measured by forward citations as having “solid and relevant inventions” it would make 
sense that the estimated coefficient is negative. Often, however, scholars associate forward citations 
with economic value and then this result would stand in contrast with the “value at stake” 
interpretation. We believe that we already control for many other factors that determine “value at 
stake” and that indeed the negative influence of patent quality in the defendant regression might 
show that the corresponding firm possess own, relevant and high quality IP and is therefore simply 
less likely to infringe others’ IP and is consequently less challenged. The fragmentation variable 
correlates positively and significantly with PLAINTIFF and DEFENDANT in Table 6 in models (4) and (5). 
When DESIGN and TRADEMARK are added to the models, this relationship disappears, though. The 
DESIGN coefficient itself is positive and significant in all three equations whereas the TRADEMARK is 
only positively significant in the regression on SETTLE.  
With regard to the remaining controls, R&D intensity is positive and significant throughout at the 
5% level. This finding is consistent with prior literature (e.g. Bessen and Meurer, 2006) as R&D may 
serve as proxy for future values at stake. Very R&D intensive firms may critically depend on 
innovations and their future market success and therefore engage in IP disputes, and they of course 
might simply have more to dispute about as they conduct high levels of R&D. Firm age is positive and 
weakly significant in the PLAINTIFF regressions; otherwise insignificant. The CASH variable is positive 
and significant in most models. This suggests, on one hand, that firms with deep pockets hesitate less 
to get involved in IP disputes. On the other hand, this result is also consistent with the “value at stake” 
interpretation if cash holdings are seen as retained earnings that may partly stem from returns of new 
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product sales (either market novelties or imitation). Firms earning more have more to lose (or “steal” 
more from others in case of the defendant equation), and therefore are more likely to be in IP 
disputes. The variable IP department is positive and significant in all regressions. This is not surprising 
as firms with a dedicated IP department will simply be more active regarding any legal dimension of 
IPRs. The sector controls are jointly significant in the PLAINTIFF and SETTLE regressions but not in the 
DEFENDANT regression. 
4.1.2 Robustness checks 
We also estimated the same specifications using multivariate Probit models, i.e. we account for 
possible error term correlations across the equations. In comparison to the single equation Probits, 
one could gain efficiency when error term correlation is taken into account. The results are robust but 
do not improve significantly. Therefore, these estimations are not presented in detail.   
Furthermore, we also tested rare event logit models, as the positive outcomes of our dependent 
variable are not very frequent. The rare event logit models following King and Zeng (2001) may also 
lead to more efficient estimates in case of rare positive outcomes. Again our results remain robust but 
do not really improve in any economically interesting way either. Therefore, we also omit detailed 
presentations of these regressions. 
We also conducted several sample splits. Our results on IMITATION SALES hold for regressions 
considering: a) only smaller firms, i.e. less than 50 employees, b) manufacturing firms, and c) younger 
firms, i.e. founded after 1988. The results on NOVELTY SALES are less stable and become less 
significant when these sample splits are applied. We therefore conclude that even for small and young 
firms IP disputes are either a relevant threat or also mechanism to defend IP. Even though there are 
some very prominent global examples of IP disputes in services (e.g. Google etc.), IP disputes seem to 
be more driven by the manufacturing sector still, and not by services. This is not too surprising when 
using European data though, as software is not patentable in Europe. 
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4.2 Requests for nullification (H4) 
In table 7 we report regression results explaining requests for nullification of the underlying IP 
conditional on an IP dispute.  There we estimate single equation Probit models using all covariates 
except the industry dummies as we only have 35 and 39 observations, respectively. We checked the 
robustness of these results by estimating Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) Heckman 
selection models for two binary variables (see e.g. Wooldridge, 2002), i.e. conditional on a litigation 
court suit, the plaintiff or defendant respectively may file a nullification suit against the other involved 
party (see Table 8). This has the advantage that we can use all 731 and 733 observations, respectively. 
However, when fitting the Heckman model, it turned out that we have to limit the number of 
covariates to achieve convergence in this more complex model. We only use the sales variables, the 
patent portfolio related variables and the age, employment and R&D intensity variables. The 
fragmentation index is used as exclusion restriction in the regression, i.e. this is included in the first 
stage on litigation suits (as also done in Tables 5 and 6), but excluded from the subsequent nullification 
regression.  
If companies get sued, they ask nullification more frequently if the stakes they have with regard 
to sales from imitations are high. The effect is always significant at the 5% level and is indicative of 
imitators trying to protect their market stakes (supports H4). 
 
 Insert table 7 about here 
Insert table 8 about here 
 
5 Conclusion 
This paper presents new empirical evidence on the determinants of IP litigation at the firm level based 
on a sample of firms covered by the Flemish part of the 2013 wave of the Community Innovation 
Survey. Our study has several features that makes it different from the bulk of litigation studies: we 
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conduct the analysis at the firm level, which has only been done in a few other papers. The firm level 
analysis allows to control for other factors beyond technological characteristics and other indicators 
derived from patent data. Our main novelty is the inclusion of the market position of firms regarding 
sales obtained with innovations, i.e. market novelties or imitation. We also consider retaliation actions 
through IP nullification suits as response to initial litigation actions. Furthermore, we also account for 
other IP than patents, namely registered industrial designs and trademarks, that might also lead to IP 
disputes. Finally, we also consider out-of-court settlements which have been largely ignored by prior 
literature. Other scholar only considered settlement within court trials. Our data show that out of 
court settlement occurs basically as frequently as formal litigation. 
Market based measures of innovation and imitation seem to be important variables when 
analyzing litigation propensities. Our results are in line with theoretical models predicting a positive 
relation between value at stake and litigation propensity (see, among others, Bebchuk, 1984; 
Hirshleifer, 1991). Next to commonly used citation-based proxies for technological value of 
innovation, we find that our newly introduced market-based indicators on the value of innovations 
and imitations matter in explaining firm-level litigation and settlement propensities. We find that firms 
with a high turnover from innovative goods and services are more likely to sue over infringement of 
their IP, when controlling for technological importance and quality of the IP portfolio. Contrastingly, 
firms with a high turnover generated from imitations and incremental innovations are sued more 
often over IP infringement. Facing fragmented IP in their technological space of activity adds to the 
likelihood of these firms being sued.  
Also, the settling propensity of firms is positively influenced by sales from imitations while 
controlling for importance and quality of the IP portfolio. Infringers, however, seem also to settle more 
often when their market stakes involved are high, thereby avoiding costly litigation and uncertain 
court outcomes.  
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The nullification suits as response to a court trial are in line with the “value at stake” mechanism. 
Firms that are generating higher sales with imitations are more likely to respond with a nullification 
suit against the IP of the plaintiff than firms with less imitation. 
Other IP such as trademarks and registered industrial designs have a significant explanatory 
power in the regressions on IP disputes, suggesting that these IPRs are also important to firms and are 
being enforced actively. 
While we argue to have good measures of firms’ market positions regarding their innovations 
and have a number of other interesting features in our empirical models, our study is of course not 
without limitations. The main limitation of this research remains possible endogeneity stemming from 
potential simultaneity between the outcome variables of IP disputes and the market-based measures 
of innovation and imitation. Addressing this concern appropriately in terms of the econometric 
approach seems almost impossible though. It would require identifying variables that independently 
affect the market positions but not the litigation propensity and, at the same time, do not depend on 
litigation. Commonly used variables that are constructed from information on product market rivals 
are conceptually ruled out in this case as these might also be involved in the court cases. 
Governmental regulation in sectors that exogenously affect sales of innovative products might be a 
solution, and a venue for future research. However, such information is not easy to collect for a sample 
of firms stemming from a large number of sectors of the economy. It might require detailed data of a 
few innovative sectors where detailed institutional knowledge about regulation can be exploited for 
identification.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (733 observations) 
 
  
Variable Variable description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Main set of Dependent variables (N = 733) 
PLAINTIFF Dummy = 1 if a company was plaintiff in an IP lawsuit 0.06 0.23 0 1 
DEFENDANT Dummy = 1 if a company was defendant in an IP lawsuit 0.05 0.21 0 1 
SETTLE Dummy = 1 if a company negotiated outside of court for a settlement on an IP dispute 0.07 0.26 0 1 
2nd set of dependent variables only observed if plaintiff or defendant take value 1, respectively 
PLAINTIFF NULL Dummy = 1 if the defendant followed up with a request for nullification of the IP when the 
variable plaintiff above is equal 1.  0.33 0.48 0 1 
DEFENDANT NULL Dummy = 1 if the variable defendant above was equal to one and they initiated a 
nullification suit against the respective plaintiff.  0.66 0.48 0 1 
Covariates (N = 733) 
SALES PRODUCTIVTY (Turnover in € 1 000 000) / #employees 0.3 0.33 0 2.95 
NOVEL SALES (Turnover with market novelties in € 1 000 000) / #employees 0.02 0.05 0 0.33 
IMITATION  (Turnover with imitation or incremental innovation in € 1 000 000) / #employees 0.02 0.04 0 0.24 
UNCHANGED (Turnover with unchanged products in € 1 000 000) / #employees 0.26 0.32 0 2.95 
EMPLOYMENT # employees 115.05 298.17 3 3828 
AGE 2013- year of foundation 27.57 18.03 3 145 
R&D INTENSITY Internal R&D expenditures / # employees 10.67 23.98 0 230.28 
PATENT INTENSITY Depreciated patent stock per employee in 2010 0.01 0.04 0 0.45 
PATENT QUALILTY Average # of forward citations per patent as of 2010 0.28 1.6 0 24 
FRAGMENTATION Measure of patent fragmentation (Ziedonis, 2004) as of 2010 0.19 0.37 0 1 
CASH AVAILABLE Cash and cash equivalent in 2010 (Bureau van Dijck – Belfirst)  in € 1 000 000 000 0.01 0.03 0 0.63 
IP DEPARTMENT Indicates whether IP tasks are handled by a separate entity within or outside firm 0.17 0.38 0 1 
DESIGN (DUMMY) Dummy = 1 if firm used industrial designs for improving its competitive position 0.18 0.39 0 1 
TRADEMARK 
(DUMMY) 
Dummy = 1 if firm used trademarks for improving its competitive position 0.34 0.47 0 1 
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Table 2: Pairwise correlation coefficients for sample of 733 observations 
 
PLAINT~ DEF~ SETTLE~ NOV~ IMIL~ UNCH~ EMPL~ AGE R&DI~ P~INT~ P~QU~ FRAG~ CASH~ IPD~ DES~ 
PLAINTIFF (DUMMY) 1               
DEFENDANT (DUMMY) 0.34 1              
SETTLE (DUMMY) 0.65 0.56 1             
NOVEL SALES 0.18 0.13 0.13 1            
IMITATION  0.08 0.13 0.12 0.19 1           
UNCHANGED 0.02 0.17 0.03 -0.02 0.04 1          
EMPLOYMENT 0.28 0.19 0.25 0.04 0.01 0.18 1         
AGE 0.11 0.03 0.09 -0.04 -0.06 0.17 0.26 1        
R&D INTENSITY 0.23 0.29 0.27 0.32 0.1 -0.08 0.13 -0.12 1       
PATENT INTENSITY 0.24 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.08 0.08 0.06 -0.06 0.31 1      
PATENT QUALILTY -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.13 -0.03 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.02 1     
FRAGMENTATION 0.25 0.22 0.25 0.13 0.04 0.1 0.28 0.09 0.24 0.49 0.29 1    
CASH AVAILABLE 0.22 0.16 0.21 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.44 0.04 0.09 0.07 0 0.15 1   
IP DEPARTMENT 0.25 0.2 0.3 0.14 0.02 0.11 0.26 0.09 0.19 0.15 0.08 0.3 0.18 1  
DESIGN (DUMMY) 0.29 0.24 0.24 0.16 0.05 0.03 0.15 0.05 0.18 0.15 -0.01 0.27 0.01 0.21 1 
TRADEMARK (DUMMY) 0.21 0.14 0.21 0.14 0.11 0.01 0.12 0.08 0.16 0.1 0.04 0.2 0.08 0.25 0.44 
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Table 3: Distribution over sectors for sample of 733 observations  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Sectors Sector description Observations 
Sec1 food, beverage, tobacco, textile, clothing and leather industries 94 
Sec2 Textile, clothing and leather industry 34 
Sec3 Manufacture of cokes, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, rubber and plastic 83 
Sec4 Manufacture of non-ferro minerals, metals and metal products (no machinery and equipment) 73 
Sec5 Manufacture of electrical equipment, IT-products, electronic and optical products 51 
Sec6 Manufacture of machinery, equipment, tools and transport 55 
Sec7 Wholesale 84 
Sec8 Telecomunication, software design and programming, computer-consultancy, information services, architects and engineering, R&D 202 
Sec9 Remaining sub-sectors 57 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics split by the binary outcome variables 
 
  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 plaintiff subsample (41  observations) defendant subsample (35 observations) settlement subsample (52 observations) 
PLAINTIFF 1 0 1 1 0.4 0.5 0 1 0.6 0.5 0 1 
DEFENDANT 0.34 0.48 0 1 1 0 1 1 0.48 0.5 0 1 
SETTLE 0.76 0.43 0 1 0.71 0.46 0 1 1 0 1 1 
NOVEL SALES 0.06 0.08 0 0.33 0.05 0.06 0 0.27 0.05 0.07 0 0.27 
IMITATION 0.03 0.06 0 0.24 0.04 0.06 0 0.21 0.03 0.06 0 0.24 
UNCHANGED 0.29 0.26 0 1.27 0.5 0.62 0 2.39 0.29 0.31 0 1.88 
EMPLOYMENT 456.66 763.52 7 3828 367.91 794.27 4 3828 385.73 687.84 5 3828 
AGE 35.8 26.09 7 117 30.11 22.55 3 88 33.73 24.41 3 117 
R&D INTENSITY 33.38 58.07 0 230.28 41.27 62.93 0 230.28 33.95 54.37 0 230.28 
PATENT INTENSITY 0.05 0.09 0 0.45 0.04 0.09 0 0.45 0.04 0.08 0 0.45 
PATENT QUALILTY 14.37 29.24 0 151 14.71 35.43 0 151 16.81 33.64 0 151 
FRAGMENTATION 0.57 0.47 0 1 0.56 0.47 0 1 0.53 0.48 0 1 
CASH AVAILABLE 0.04 0.11 0 0.63 0.03 0.11 0 0.63 0.03 0.1 0 0.63 
IP DEPARTMENT 0.56 0.5 0 1 0.51 0.51 0 1 0.58 0.5 0 1 
DESIGN (dummy) 0.63 0.49 0 1 0.6 0.5 0 1 0.52 0.5 0 1 
TRADEMARK (dummy) 0.76 0.43 0 1 0.63 0.49 0 1 0.71 0.46 0 1 
 non-plaintiff subsample (692 observations) non-defendant subsample (698 observations) non-settlement subsample (681 observations) 
PLAINTIFF  0 0 0 0 0.04 0.19 0 1 0.01 0.12 0 1 
DEFENDANT 0.03 0.17 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.12 0 1 
SETTLE 0.03 0.17 0 1 0.04 0.19 0 1 0 0 0 0 
NOVEL SALES 0.02 0.04 0 0.32 0.02 0.04 0 0.33 0.02 0.04 0 0.33 
IMITATION 0.02 0.03 0 0.23 0.02 0.03 0 0.24 0.02 0.03 0 0.23 
UNCHANGED 0.26 0.33 0 2.95 0.24 0.3 0 2.95 0.25 0.32 0 2.95 
EMPLOYMENT 94.8 230.44 3 3520 102.37 243.36 3 3520 94.38 232.79 3 3520 
AGE 27.09 17.35 3 145 27.45 17.79 3 145 27.1 17.39 3 145 
R&D INTENSITY 9.33 19.54 0 186.07 9.14 19.02 0 186.07 8.89 18.79 0 186.07 
PATENT INTENSITY 0.01 0.03 0 0.4 0.01 0.04 0 0.4 0.01 0.03 0 0.4 
PATENT QUALILTY 2.63 16.28 0 274 2.71 15.86 0 274 2.25 15.09 0 274 
FRAGMENTATION 0.17 0.35 0 1 0.17 0.36 0 1 0.16 0.35 0 0.99 
CASH AVAILABLE 0 0.02 0 0.37 0 0.02 0 0.37 0 0.02 0 0.37 
IP DEPARTMENT 0.15 0.35 0 1 0.15 0.36 0 1 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Design (dummy) 0.15 0.36 0 1 0.16 0.37 0 1 0.16 0.36 0 1 
TRADEMARK (dummy) 0.32 0.47 0 1 0.33 0.47 0 1 0.31 0.46 0 1 
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Table 5:  Litigation propensities - single equation probit estimations – sales per employee not split 
Notes: Significance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%, * 10%; standard errors clustered at the NACE 3-digit level 
  
 
b/se 
(1) 
Plaintiff 
(2) 
Defendant 
(3) 
Settle 
(4) 
Plaintiff 
(5) 
Defendant 
(6) 
Settle 
(7) 
Plaintiff 
(8) 
Defendant 
(9) 
Settle 
SALES/EMPLOYM. 0.102 0.748*** 0.06 -0.337 0.642*** -0.217 -0.422 0.699*** -0.237  
(0.258) (0.157) (0.208) (0.334) (0.165) (0.234) (0.393) (0.159) (0.264)    
EMPLOYMENT 0.001*** 0.000* 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.001** 0.000 0.000  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
AGE 0.007 -0.002 0.005 0.009** -0.002 0.005 0.008* -0.003 0.003  
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)    
R&D INTENISTY 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.011***  
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)    
PATENT INTENSITY    4.467** 0.404 2.381 5.682*** 0.503 2.65  
   (2.036) (1.207) (1.709) (2.093) (1.108) (1.615)    
PATENT QUALITY    -0.008** -0.001 0.001 -0.009* 0.000 0.002  
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)    
FRAGMENTATION    0.412* 0.459* 0.268 0.144 0.289 0.114  
   (0.236) (0.252) (0.233) (0.246) (0.240) (0.222)    
CASH AVAILABLE     2.991** 1.615 2.658** 3.913*** 2.472* 3.254*** 
    (1.202) (1.452) (1.224) (1.221) (1.456) (1.236)    
IP DEPARTMENT    0.752*** 0.555** 0.892*** 0.656*** 0.437* 0.793*** 
    (0.218) (0.238) (0.187) (0.249) (0.251) (0.198)    
DESIGN       0.868*** 0.758*** 0.504**   
      (0.247) (0.239) (0.243)    
TRADEMARK       0.508* 0.067 0.494**   
      (0.261) (0.225) (0.233)    
Intercept -2.352*** -2.041*** -1.795*** -2.471*** -2.144*** -1.858*** -3.017*** -2.268*** -2.128*** 
 (0.347) (0.271) (0.210) (0.393) (0.272) (0.227) (0.445) (0.289) (0.237)    
Sector- dummies Incl.** Incl. Incl.*** Incl.*** Incl. Incl.*** Incl.*** Incl. Incl.*** 
Pseudo R2 0.218 0.205 0.175 0.326 0.261 0.275 0.414 0.309 0.325 
#obs 733 733 733 733 733 733 733 733 733 
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Table 6:  Litigation propensities - single equation probit estimations – sales per employee split by sales categories 
Notes: Significance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%, * 10%; standard errors clustered at the NACE 3-digit level 
  
 
b/se 
(1) 
Plaintiff 
(2) 
Defendant 
(3) 
Settle 
(4) 
Plaintiff 
(5) 
Defendant 
(6) 
Settle 
(7) 
Plaintiff 
(8) 
Defendant 
(9) 
Settle 
NOVEL SALES 3.755** 1.098 1.161 4.145** 2.033 0.742 3.756** 1.59 -0.279  
(1.666) (1.393) (1.651) (1.653) (1.651) (1.820) (1.864) (1.726) (2.000) 
IMITATION  3.287 4.158** 4.230** 2.889 4.051** 4.669** 2.802 4.145** 4.673**  
(2.059) (1.659) (1.745) (2.254) (1.732) (1.867) (2.801) (1.952) (2.060) 
UNCHANGED -0.16 0.693*** -0.079 -0.558 0.687*** -0.421 -0.678 0.731*** -0.424 
 (0.271) (0.176) (0.266) (0.358) (0.183) (0.286) (0.413) (0.180) (0.302) 
EMPLOYMENT 0.001*** 0.000* 0.001*** 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AGE 0.008* -0.001 0.006 0.009** -0.002 0.006 0.009* -0.003 0.004  
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
R&D INTENISTY 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.011***  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
PATENT INTENSITY    2.475 -1.452 2.306 3.58 -1.105 2.948  
   (2.085) (1.381) (1.921) (2.281) (1.369) (2.016) 
PATENT QUALITY    -0.129* -0.343*** -0.009 -0.124* -0.338*** 0.003  
   (0.077) (0.111) (0.056) (0.073) (0.109) (0.058) 
FRAGMENTATION    0.550** 0.714** 0.327 0.293 0.536* 0.156  
   (0.253) (0.284) (0.252) (0.262) (0.278) (0.242) 
CASH AVAILABLE     3.111** 1.49 2.756** 4.384*** 2.337* 3.420** 
    (1.211) (1.428) (1.307) (1.346) (1.415) (1.347) 
IP DEPARTMENT    0.772*** 0.550** 0.912*** 0.661*** 0.433* 0.810*** 
    (0.223) (0.252) (0.193) (0.256) (0.259) (0.209) 
DESIGN       0.888*** 0.736*** 0.521**  
      (0.244) (0.236) (0.249) 
TRADEMARK       0.432 0.028 0.461**  
      (0.264) (0.213) (0.230) 
Intercept -2.448*** -2.168*** -1.921*** -2.501*** -2.221*** -1.980*** -3.031*** -2.339*** -2.255*** 
 (0.399) (0.274) (0.211) (0.432) (0.252) (0.225) (0.478) (0.279) (0.240) 
Sector- dummies Incl.*** Incl. Incl.*** Incl.*** Incl. Incl.*** Incl.*** Incl. Incl.*** 
Pseudo R2 0.244 0.216 0.191 0.349 0.295 0.294 0.43 0.336 0.339 
#obs 733 733 733 733 733 733 733 733 733 
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Table 7: Subsequent nullification suits - probit estimations 
 
b/se 
(1) 
PlaintiffNull 
(2) 
DefendantNull 
(3) 
PlaintiffNull 
(4) 
DefendantNull 
(5) 
PlaintiffNull 
(6) 
DefendantNull 
NOVEL SALES -1.29 -5.186 -2.957 -3.427 -1.808 -4.112  
(3.194) (6.961) (4.132) (7.878) (4.139) (9.453)    
IMITATION  6.628 9.202** 6.427 14.267*** 6.84 22.132***  
(4.058) (3.930) (4.266) (4.348) (4.709) (6.198)    
UNCHANGED -0.254 -0.559 -0.532 -1.123 -1.164 -1.211**  
 (1.144) (0.460) (1.285) (0.739) (1.534) (0.484)    
EMPLOYMENT 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.008***  
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)    
AGE 0.020** 0.01 0.025** 0.000 0.032*** -0.023  
(0.010) (0.018) (0.010) (0.021) (0.012) (0.018)    
R&D INTENISTY 0.002 0.01 0.003 0.002 0.007 0.003  
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.011) (0.007) (0.012)    
PATENT INTENSITY   6.077 -4.549 9.201* 6.007  
  (3.747) (11.558) (5.557) (9.501)    
PATENT QUALITY   -0.015 0.045 -0.024 0.000  
  (0.019) (0.058) (0.025) (0.052)    
FRAGMENTATION   -0.401 -0.436 -0.946 -1.266  
  (0.580) (0.664) (0.862) (0.786)    
CASH AVAILABLE   -0.388 67.749 1.236 121.447*** 
   (2.718) (47.686) (3.130) (38.947)    
IP DEPARTMENT   0.352 0.658 0.631 1.351*   
   (0.461) (0.623) (0.500) (0.780)    
DESIGN     0.775 -1.2  
    (0.612) (0.870)    
TRADEMARK     -1.035 -1.390*    
    (0.952) (0.838)    
Intercept -1.354** -0.368 -1.658** -0.353 -1.739** 0.773  
(0.539) (0.560) (0.662) (0.613) (0.758) (0.633)    
#obs 39 35 39 35 39 35 
Notes: Significance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%, * 10%; standard errors clustered at the NACE 3-digit level 
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Table 8: Subsequent nullification suits –Probit models with Heckman selection (FIML estimations) 
 
b/se 
(1) 
PlaintiffNull 
(2) 
Plaintiff 
(3) 
DefendantNull 
(4) 
Defendant 
NOVEL SALES -1.557 2.625* -6.327 0.832  
(3.297) (1.439) (6.742)    (1.395)    
IMITATION 7.742** 3.143 10.936*** 4.247**   
(3.918) (1.984) (3.924)    (1.683)    
UNCHANGED -0.687 -0.427 -0.256 0.614*** 
 (1.101) (0.301) (0.773)    (0.162)    
EMPLOYMENT 0.001 0.001*** 0.002 0.000  
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002)    (0.000)    
AGE 0.025*** 0.010*** 0.012 0.000  
(0.008) (0.004) (0.017)    (0.004)    
R&D INTENISTY 0.004 0.006*** 0.013 0.011***  
(0.004) (0.002) (0.010)    (0.002)    
PATENT INTENSITY 6.997* 3.886*** -1.914 0.169  
(3.773) (1.388) (8.668)    (1.155)    
PATENT QUALITY -0.017 -0.008* 0.019 -0.003  
(0.015) (0.004) (0.018)    (0.003)    
FRAGMENTATION  0.590**  0.640***  
 (0.254)  (0.222)    
Constant -2.893*** -2.415*** -1.512 -2.431***  
(0.972) (0.201) (2.598)    (0.161)    
#obs  731 733 
Censored 39 35 
Uncensored 692 698 
Correlation among eqs. Insignificant Insignificant 
Notes: Significance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%, * 10%; standard errors clustered at the NACE 3-digit level 
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Table S1:  Litigation propensities - single equation logit estimations 
Notes: Significance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%, * 10%; standard errors clustered at the NACE 3-digit level 
  
 
b/se 
(1) 
Plaintiff 
(2) 
Defendant 
(3) 
Settle 
(4) 
Plaintiff 
(5) 
Defendant 
(6) 
Settle 
(7) 
Plaintiff 
(8) 
Defendant 
(9) 
Settle 
NOVEL SALES 8.048*** 2.07 2.929 8.493*** 3.656 1.805 7.311** 2.36 -0.02  
(3.098) (2.742) (3.307) (3.024) (3.311) (3.660) (3.717) (3.273) (4.026) 
IMITATION  6.043 8.928*** 8.090** 5.596 8.234** 9.157** 5.239 8.680** 9.152**  
(3.807) (3.417) (3.247) (4.736) (3.391) (3.585) (6.408) (4.059) (4.030) 
UNCHANGED -0.472 1.388*** -0.221 -1.161 1.337*** -0.804 -1.339* 1.426*** -0.8 
 (0.612) (0.347) (0.584) (0.719) (0.363) (0.593) (0.812) (0.364) (0.628) 
EMPLOYMENT 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001*** 0.001* 0.000 0.001* 0.001 0.000 0.001  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
AGE 0.017** -0.002 0.014* 0.018** -0.006 0.013 0.016 -0.008 0.01  
(0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
R&D INTENISTY 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.019*** 0.025*** 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.023*** 0.020***  
(0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) 
PATENT INTENSITY    3.899 -2.923 3.889 6.624 -2.018 5.346  
   (4.337) (2.679) (3.989) (4.836) (2.968) (4.315) 
PATENT QUALITY    -0.24 -0.610*** -0.049 -0.198 -0.600*** -0.009  
   (0.148) (0.188) (0.144) (0.143) (0.178) (0.138) 
FRAGMENTATION    1.112** 1.509** 0.76 0.553 1.098* 0.394  
   (0.546) (0.648) (0.505) (0.570) (0.605) (0.503) 
CASH AVAILABLE     5.878*** 3.041 4.981** 7.872*** 4.401* 6.058** 
    (1.879) (2.361) (2.188) (2.262) (2.397) (2.374) 
IP DEPARTMENT    1.446*** 0.995* 1.769*** 1.200** 0.726 1.551*** 
    (0.483) (0.543) (0.389) (0.519) (0.544) (0.417) 
DESIGN       1.618*** 1.452*** 0.956*  
      (0.534) (0.483) (0.499) 
TRADEMARK       0.865 0.18 0.883*  
      (0.603) (0.457) (0.485) 
Intercept -4.508*** -4.114*** -3.482*** -4.657*** -4.097*** -3.644*** -5.457*** -4.402*** -4.120*** 
 (0.889) (0.638) (0.446) (0.984) (0.555) (0.474) (1.041) (0.605) (0.497) 
Sector- dummies Incl.** Incl. Incl.*** Incl.*** Incl. Incl.*** Incl.*** Incl. Incl.*** 
Pseudo R2 0.238 0.216 0.187 0.343 0.296 0.294 0.417 0.337 0.336 
#obs 733 733 733 733 733 733 733 733 733 
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Table S2:  Litigation propensities – simultaneous equations probit estimations 
Notes: Notes: Significance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%, * 10%; standard errors clustered at the NACE 3-digit level; all correlation coefficients measuring the error term correlation across equations 
are estimated to be positive and significant at the 1% level 
 
b/se 
(1) 
Plaintiff 
(2) 
Defendant 
(3) 
Settle 
(4) 
Plaintiff 
(5) 
Defendant 
(6) 
Settle 
(7) 
Plaintiff 
(8) 
Defendant 
(9) 
Settle 
NOVEL SALES 4.043** 1.314 1.408 3.649** 1.356 0.555 3.189* 1.097 -0.108  
(1.601) (1.406) (1.538) (1.647) (1.629) (1.893) (1.879) (1.695) (1.907) 
IMITATION  2.143 3.662** 3.507** 2.525 3.555** 3.711** 2.073 3.701** 3.233  
(2.046) (1.681) (1.637) (2.332) (1.746) (1.749) (2.929) (1.876) (1.970) 
UNCHANGED -0.113 0.731*** -0.011 -0.707** 0.593*** -0.381 -0.776* 0.674*** -0.33 
 (0.200) (0.170) (0.216) (0.341) (0.192) (0.268) (0.405) (0.186) (0.301) 
EMPLOYMENT 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.001** 0.000 0.000  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AGE 0.007 0.000 0.006 0.008* -0.002 0.006 0.008 -0.003 0.005  
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
R&D INTENISTY 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.012***  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
PATENT INTENSITY    3.953** -0.311 2.033 4.967*** -0.122 2.074  
   (1.928) (1.454) (1.951) (1.843) (1.409) (1.996) 
PATENT QUALITY    -0.008* -0.002 0.001 -0.006 -0.001 0.001  
   (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
FRAGMENTATION    0.490** 0.596** 0.31 0.232 0.383 0.241  
   (0.240) (0.265) (0.234) (0.282) (0.260) (0.226) 
CASH AVAILABLE     3.232** 1.337 2.691* 4.391*** 2.159 3.021* 
    (1.378) (1.483) (1.481) (1.366) (1.453) (1.662) 
IP DEPARTMENT    0.803*** 0.603** 0.938*** 0.597*** 0.507** 0.810*** 
    (0.211) (0.241) (0.184) (0.220) (0.248) (0.179) 
DESIGN       0.859*** 0.677*** 0.425*  
      (0.240) (0.234) (0.220) 
TRADEMARK       0.545** 0.102 0.456**  
      (0.231) (0.214) (0.208) 
Intercept -2.437*** -2.184*** -1.960*** -2.537*** -2.270*** -2.026*** -3.024*** -2.406*** -2.304*** 
 (0.376) (0.272) (0.195) (0.411) (0.252) (0.230) (0.476) (0.294) (0.223) 
Sector- dummies Incl.*** Incl.* Incl.** Incl.*** Incl. Incl.*** Incl.*** Incl. Incl.** 
#obs 733 733 733 733 733 733 733 733 733 
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Table S3:  Litigation propensities - single equation rare event logit estimations 
Notes: Notes: Significance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%, * 10%; standard errors clustered at the NACE 3-digit level; 
  
 
b/se 
(1) 
Plaintiff 
(2) 
Defendant 
(3) 
Settle 
(4) 
Plaintiff 
(5) 
Defendant 
(6) 
Settle 
(7) 
Plaintiff 
(8) 
Defendant 
(9) 
Settle 
NOVEL SALES 7.800** 2.293 3.115 7.674*** 3.647 2.002 6.460* 2.764 0.204  
(3.036) (2.687) (3.240) (2.944) (3.223) (3.563) (3.609) (3.178) (3.908) 
IMITATION  6.005 8.872*** 7.989** 5.349 7.802** 8.749** 4.985 8.099** 8.713**  
(3.731) (3.348) (3.181) (4.610) (3.301) (3.490) (6.221) (3.941) (3.912) 
UNCHANGED -0.355 1.325*** -0.135 -0.929 1.254*** -0.663 -1.013 1.320*** -0.627 
 (0.599) (0.340) (0.572) (0.700) (0.353) (0.577) (0.788) (0.354) (0.610) 
EMPLOYMENT 0.001*** 0.001 0.001*** 0.001 0.000 0.001* 0.001 0.000 0.001  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
AGE 0.017** -0.001 0.014* 0.016* -0.006 0.012 0.014 -0.008 0.009  
(0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) 
R&D INTENISTY 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.015*** 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.015** 0.019*** 0.018***  
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) 
PATENT INTENSITY    3.066 -2.675 3.726 5.913 -1.584 5.346  
   (4.221) (2.608) (3.883) (4.695) (2.882) (4.189) 
PATENT QUALITY    -0.113 -0.445** 0.02 -0.038 -0.434** 0.058  
   (0.144) (0.183) (0.140) (0.138) (0.173) (0.134) 
FRAGMENTATION    1.041* 1.404** 0.688 0.483 1.009* 0.323  
   (0.532) (0.631) (0.492) (0.553) (0.588) (0.489) 
CASH AVAILABLE     4.468** 2.215 3.672* 5.931*** 3.163 4.440* 
    (1.829) (2.298) (2.130) (2.196) (2.327) (2.305) 
IP DEPARTMENT    1.356*** 0.948* 1.668*** 1.099** 0.695 1.446*** 
    (0.470) (0.529) (0.378) (0.504) (0.529) (0.405) 
DESIGN       1.426*** 1.272*** 0.876*  
      (0.518) (0.469) (0.484) 
TRADEMARK       0.75 0.151 0.809*  
      (0.585) (0.444) (0.471) 
Intercept -4.254*** -3.934*** -3.374*** -4.307*** -3.803*** -3.485*** -4.892*** -3.980*** -3.879*** 
 (0.871) (0.625) (0.437) (0.958) (0.540) (0.462) (1.011) (0.587) (0.483) 
Sector- dummies Incl.*** Incl. Incl. Incl.*** Incl. Incl.*** Incl.*** Incl. Incl.*** 
#obs 733 733 733 733 733 733 733 733 733 
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Survey questions for the dependent variables on IP disputes and Nullification (translated from Dutch into English) 
 
1. Was your company in the period 2010-2012 accused by other companies of infringement of their Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) before the court of law?  
 
 
No          ► Go to question 3 
Yes         ► Go to question 2 
 
2. Was in response to this accusation nullification of the IPR requested?  
No         . 
Yes        . 
 
3. Did your company in the period 2010-2012 accuse other companies of infringement of your IPR before the court of law?  
No         ► Go to question 5 
Yes        ► Go to question 4 
 
4. Was in response to this accusation nullification of the IPR requested? 
No        . 
Yes       . 
 
5. Did your company, in the period 2010-2012, conduct negotiations or made settlements outside the court of law to avoid litigation concerning IPR. 
 
No      . 
Yes     . 
